The theoretical study of social learning by observation typically assumes that each agent's action only affects her own payoff. In this paper, I present a model in which agents' actions directly affect one another's payoff. On a discrete time line, there is a community of finitely many agents in each period. Each community receives a private signal about the underlying state of the world and may observe some past actions in previous communities. Agents in the same community then simultaneously take an action, and each agent's payoff is higher if her action matches the state, and also higher if more agents take that same action. I analyze both the case where observation is exogenous and the one where observation can be strategically chosen by paying a cost. I show that in both cases network externalities in payoff enhance social learning, in the sense that the highest probability of agents taking the correct action in equilibrium is significantly higher with large communities than with small communities.
Introduction
The study of social learning focuses on how valuable information gets transmitted in a society of self-interested and strategic agents, as well as how dispersed and decentralized information gets aggregated to facilitate more precise knowledge. A typical situation involves a large number of individuals who make a single decision sequentially. The payoff of this decision depends on an unknown state of the world, about which each individual is given a noisy signal. The state of the world may refer to different economic variables in different applications, for instance the quality of a new product, the return of an investment opportunity, the intrinsic value of a research project, etc. The probabilistic distribution of signals depends on the state and is assumed to be The above framework has been adopted widely in the literature, including but not exclusive to the notable study of herding behavior and information cascades in various applications, such as investment [32] , bank runs [17] and technology adoption [13] . Among the literature that provides a theoretical analysis, renowned early research by Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch [7] , Banerjee [5] and Smith and Sorensen [33] demonstrates that efficient information aggregation may fail: in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, the individuals eventually herd on the "wrong" action with positive probability. Recent works such as Acemoglu et al. [1] consider a more general and stochastic observation structure, and point out that society's learning of the true state depends on two factors: the possibility of arbitrarily strong private signals (unbounded private beliefs), and the nonexistence of excessively influential individuals (expanding observations).
However, despite the large theoretical literature on social learning and information externalities, most of the models fail to take into account a crucial factor that influences individual strategic behaviors. They consider only information externalities but not payoff externalities (often referred to as network externalities): individual 1's action only affects individual 2's payoff indirectly by the information it contains about private signal, but not directly in the sense that 2 never cares about whether the two actions are unanimous. This assumption greatly limits the range of applications that can be analyzed using the framework, because network externali-ties are prevalent in many strategic environments that involve social learning, ranging from the choice of software or hardware to the choice of research area. Moreover, the very existence of network externalities often facilitates local information sharing in both signal and observation since individuals now have mutual interests for doing so. Hence in the presence of this effect, one should expect to see very different patterns of action as well as information update in the observational learning process. In addition, most existing literature typically assumes that observation is given by some exogenous stochastic process, while in many applications it is part of an agent's strategic decision. Imaginably, once observation becomes a choice, it should have an immediate effect on the accuracy of action and also change the way network externalities influence social learning. A more general framework is needed to include these important elements in the study of social learning and fully understand their impact.
To fix ideas on the typical strategic environment with the above features, consider the following example. There are a group of consumers who need to decide which one of two possible smartphones to switch to. The sequence of actions is determined by the expiration dates of their current contract. Among this group there are smaller "communities" of consumers (for example college friends that enroll in the same wireless package) that make their decisions within a relatively small interval of time. For a consumer in an arbitrary community, because interaction is more convenient among people using the same smart phone, she prefers others to use the same model as she does (network externalities). Before she makes her own decision, she may observe some previously made decisions from other communities. On one hand, such observations may be random: they may simply come from noticing which smartphone other people are using in daily life. Alternatively, observations may be strategically chosen: the consumer can pay a registration fee to enter an online forum, where she can see other consumers' choices with corresponding time stamps. If she is not able to go over all the available posts, she has to select the most informative ones. Finally, regardless of the observation structure, she will most likely share her observations with others in her community but not any outsider.
In this paper, I propose a model that is consistent with the framework of Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch [7] and Acemoglu et al. [1] , and at the same time flexible to include network externalities under different observation structures. More formally, there is an underlying state of the world, which is binary in value and cannot be observed directly. On an infinite and discrete time line, there is a community of a given size in each period, the members of which (the agents) simultaneously take a binary action each. The payoff of an agent depends on whether her action matches the state as well as what actions are taken by others in her community. The more agents taking the same action as she does, the higher payoff she enjoys. At the beginning of the period, the agents in a community obtain a noisy signal about the true state 1 . The value of this signal is common knowledge within the community, but is not observable to any other community.
After obtaining the signal but before taking the action, the agents simultaneously observe a subset of actions of their predecessors, i.e. agents from previous communities. The observed actions are locally shared information as well: in other words, actions observed by one agent is also observed by every other agent within the same community. Observation is exogenous if it is generated by some given stochastic process. It is endogenous if each agent can choose to pay a fixed cost and select a given number of ordered actions to observe.
Hence, there are three central determinants for the pattern of social learning: signal strength (bounded or unbounded beliefs), observation structure (exogenous or endogenous) and level of externalities (singleton community or non-singleton community). This paper establishes the first theoretical framework to understand the interaction among these factors, and to finally answer the question of when observation is truth-revealing and whether asymptotic learning occurs in this more realistic but complex environment. In particular, I highlight the contrast between the pattern of learning in a singleton community and that in a large community. As can be expected, network externalities in a large community brings about an additional "desire to conform" which is absent when each agent only cares about her own action. However, as my major findings summarized below suggest, incentive to go along with the group is not all bad. On the contrary, network externalities may improve learning in each combination of signal structure and observation structure.
First, suppose that observation is exogenous. When beliefs are unbounded, meaning that a private signal may be arbitrarily informative about the true state, agents can almost surely know the state from their observed action sequence if they always observe an action which is taken recently. Moreover, since observation is independent from signal value, the stronger notion asymptotic learning can be achieved: agents do not only know the true state with almost certainty, their actions converge to the "correct" one as well. This result holds regardless of the community size and is consistent with existing results in the theoretical literature.
When beliefs are bounded, network externalities facilitates better learning. It has been proved in previous research that when only one agent moves in each period (i.e. the community size is one), observation never reveals the truth over time. However, I show that when the community size expands, there exists an equilibrium with truth-telling observation. In such 1 The assumption of one signal for each community is without loss of generality in the case of local sharing.
Equivalently, we could assume that each agent has one signal which she only shares with others in her community.
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an equilibrium, an agent may take either of the two actions for any possible posterior belief she has on the true state: with a positive probability she takes her action according to the signal, and otherwise according to the observation. A rough intuition for this result is that when the community size is sufficiently large, if all but one agent in a community choose one action, it would be optimal for the remaining agent to choose the same action even if it is unlikely to be the "correct" one. Hence, even under bounded beliefs it is possible for every agent to base her action on her signal for a non-zero measure of signals, no matter when she moves in the action sequence. This ensures efficient information aggregation from observing the predecessors' actions. As an further result, depending on the construction of equilibrium strategies, the probability of taking the correct action can get arbitrarily close to 1 in the limit, meaning that asymptotic learning can be approximated under large network externalities even though the most precise signal only bears limited informativeness. Indeed, as long as the probability of agents acting only according to the signal is positive, observation reveals the truth in the limit. Hence decreasing this probability in turn increases the probability of taking the correct action. Now suppose that observation is endogenous. A first observation is that even under unbounded private beliefs, asymptotic learning is not achievable: the probability of taking the correct action is always bounded away from 1. The reason is that with costly observation, an agent is not willing to observe whenever her signal is sufficiently precise but still not perfect. I then give a sufficient and necessary condition for truth-telling observation: the size of an agent's possible observation gets arbitrarily large over time. Because of the impossibility of asymptotic learning, any observation of finitely many actions has erroneous implication on the true state with positive probability; this probability of error can be eliminated once infinitely many actions are observed.
With the presence of network externalities, the equilibrium learning patterns change significantly. As the community size increases, an equilibrium emerges with asymptotic learning (with unbounded beliefs) or approximate asymptotic learning (with bounded beliefs). Moreover, this result does not require any condition on the size of observation, as long as each agent can observe at least one action among her predecessors. Such improvement in learning is driven by the possibility of incentivizing observation in a large community. For illustration, imagine a community where all but one agent choose not to observe any action. For the remaining agent, her observation is very valuable to both her peers and herself, because when agents care about the action of one another, even a small improvement in learning about the true state brings a considerable increase in everyone's payoff. Following this intuition, I show that there exists an equilibrium in which at least one agent always chooses to observe for any value of the private signal. Therefore, the argument under exogenous observation can be applied to establish or approximate asymptotic learning. This result implies that the negative incentive for observation, as induced by observation cost, can be eliminated by the marginal benefit of observation under network externalities. At the same time, efficient information aggregation still exists as a result of either unbounded beliefs or a small but positive probability of coordinated actions based on signal only.
One prominent difference made by incorporating network externalities in the model is that multiple equilibria arises in general, in contrast to the generically unique equilibrium with singleton communities. In the discussion section, I address the issue of equilibrium selection by imposing the criterion of risk dominance. I show that the equilibrium where each agent always maximizes the probability of action matching the state is risk dominant, and that this equilibrium still leads to asymptotic learning when beliefs are unbounded and community size is large. Under bounded beliefs, however, the risk dominant equilibrium has different implications: depending on the observation structure, the equilibrium learning probability with network externalities may be higher, lower or unchanged compared to that with singleton agents.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a review of the related literature. Section 3 introduces the model. Section 4 and 5 present the main results under exogenous observation and endogenous observation correspondingly. Section 6 discusses some additional features and extensions of the model. Section 7 concludes. All the proofs are included in the Appendix.
Literature Review
A large and growing literature studies the problem of social learning by Bayesian agents who can observe others' choices. This literature begins with Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch [7] and Banerjee [5] , who first formalize the problem systematically and concisely and point to information cascades as the cause of herding behavior. In their models, the informativeness of the observed action history outweighs that of any private signal with a positive probability, and herding occurs as a result. Smith and Sorensen [33] propose a comprehensive model of a similar environment with a more general signal structure. Their results and the concepts of bounded and unbounded private beliefs, which they introduced, will play an important role in the rest of the paper. These seminal papers, along with the general discussion by Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch [8] , assume that agents can observe the entire previous decision history, i.e., the whole ordered set of choices of their predecessors. This assumption can be regarded as an extreme case of exogenous network structure. Related contributions to the literature include Lee [29] , Banerjee [6] and Celen and Kariv [12] , where agents only observe a given fraction of the entire decision history.
A more recent paper, Acemoglu et al. [1] , studies the environment where each agent receives a private signal about the underlying state of the world and observes (some of) their predecessors' actions according to a general stochastic network topology. Their main result states that when the private signal structure features unbounded belief, asymptotic learning occurs in each equilibrium if and only if the observation structure exhibits expanding observations. Other recent research in this area include Banerjee and Fudenberg [4] , Gale and Kariv [22] , Callander and Horner [10] and Smith and Sorensen [34] , which differ from Acemoglu et al. [1] mainly in making alternative assumption for observation, i.e., that agents only observe the number of others taking each available action but not the positions of the observed agents in the decision sequence.
Two common assumptions made in the above mentioned literature are exogenous observation and pure informational externalities, the latter meaning that an agent only cares about taking the correct action and her payoff is not directly affected by others' actions. The literature towards relaxing either of these assumptions is relatively under-developed. A few recent papers started the discussion on the impact of costly observation on social learning. In Kultti and Miettinen [27] [28] , both the underlying state and the private signal are binary, and an agent pay a cost for each action she observes. In Celen [11] , the signal structure is similar to the general one adopted in this paper, but it is assumed that an agent can pay a cost to observe the entire action history before her. A much richer model is given by Song [35] , in the sense that it allows for the most general signal structure, as well as the possibility that agents would have to strategically choose a proper subset of their predecessors' actions to observe. A major implication from these works is that the existence of observation cost prevents asymptotic learning, though it may increase the informativeness of an observed action sequence because agents will sometimes rationally choose not to observe and rely on their signal.
The theoretical literature on the interplay between information cascades and network externalities is also rather small. Moreover, the existing few papers often differ from one another in important aspects such as the payoff function, the sequence of moves and the information update process (see e.g. Choi [13] , Dasgupta [15] , Jeitschko and Taylor [26] , Frisell [21] , Vergari [36] ).
On the other hand, there is also a small literature on experimental studies of information cascades and payoff externalities (see e.g. Hung and Plott [24] , Drehmann et al. [18] ). Their major results suggest a learning pattern which is consistent with this paper: when agents care about the actions of one another besides the information externalities, they are more likely to conform but also more likely to take the "correct" action. Informational herding is hence reduced. This paper can be placed in the lineage of Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch [7] , Smith and Sorensen [33] , Acemoglu et al. [1] and others, in the sense that I adopt the general signal structure and the sequential decision process developed in these models. Nevertheless, this paper differ from the previous research in two important aspects. First, instead of assuming an exogenous observation structure, I allow observation to be made as a part of an agent's strategic decision.
Second, in addition to informational externalities, my model also features payoff externalities: the more agents taking the same action, the higher payoff each such agent enjoys. As will be shown in the remainder of the paper, these assumptions are not only more realistic in most applications, but also have significant impact on the equilibrium learning pattern.
In this paper and most cited theoretical papers above, agents are assumed to update their beliefs according to the Bayes' rule. There is also a well-known literature on non-Bayesian observational learning. In these models, rather than applying Bayes' update to obtain the posterior belief regarding the underlying state of the world by using all the available information, agents may adopt some intuitive rule of thumb to guide their choices (Ellison and Fudenberg[19] or be subject to a certain bias in interpreting information (DeMarzo, Vayanos and Zwiebel [16] ).
Finally, the importance of observational learning has been well documented in both empirical and experimental studies, in addition to those already mentioned. Conley and Udry [14] and Munshi [31] both focus on the adoption of new agricultural technology and not only support the importance of observational learning but also indicate that observation is often constrained because a farmer may not be able, in practice, to receive information regarding the choice of every other farmer in the area. Munshi [30] and Ioannides and Loury [25] demonstrate that social networks play an important role in individuals' information acquisition regarding employment.
Cai, Chen and Fang [9] conduct a natural field experiment to indicate the empirical significance of observational learning in which consumers obtain information about product quality from the purchasing decisions of others. 8 
Model

Private Signal Structure
Consider a discrete and infinite time line: t = 1, 2, .... At each period t, there is a set of agents Q t that move simultaneously. We refer to Q t as a community. We assume that Q t are of the same size, i.e. for all t, |Q t | = Q for some Q ∈ N. Let θ ∈ {0, 1} be the state of the world with equal prior probabilities, i.e., P rob(θ = 0) = P rob(θ = 1) = 1 2 . Given θ, an i.i.d. private signal s t ∈ S = (−1, 1) realizes in period t, which is observed by every agent in Q t and no one else. An alternative and mathematically equivalent interpretation is that each agent receives a private signal and shares it with the rest of her community.
The probability distributions regarding the signal conditional on the state are denoted as F 0 (s) and F 1 (s) (with continuous density functions f 0 (s) and f 1 (s)). The pair of measures (F 0 , F 1 ) are referred to as the signal structure, and I assume that the signal structure has the following properties:
1. The pdfs f 0 (s) and f 1 (s) are continuous and non-zero everywhere on the support, which immediately implies that no signal is fully revealing regarding the underlying state.
Monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP):
is strictly increasing in s. This assumption is made without loss of generality: as long as no two signals generate the same likelihood ratio, the signals can always be re-aligned to form a structure that satisfies the MLRP.
3. Symmetry: f 1 (s) = f 0 (−s) for any s. This assumption can be interpreted as indicating that the signal structure is unbiased. In other words, the distribution of an agent's private belief, which is determined by the likelihood ratio, would be symmetric between the two states.
Assumptions 1 and 2 are both mild assumptions adopted by most literature on observational learning. Assumption 3 is relatively strong, but it only serves as a simplifying assumption for proving most of the results, which can be readily extended to an asymmetric signal structure with added technicalities. In this paper, I assume symmetric signals throughout for concise notations and clearer interpretation of the results.
The focus of this paper is to inspect the interaction among signal, observation and externalities, and to identify conditions that need to be imposed on each factor to ensure the highest possible level of learning. To address this issue and state the major findings, it is useful to first introduce a notation that categorizes the signal structure. The private belief of an agent is defined by the probability of the true state being 1 according to her signal only, and is given by 
The Sequential Decision Process
The agents in Q t simultaneously take a single action each between 0 and 1. Let a t n ∈ {0, 1} denote agent n's action.
Agent n cares about the action of every agent in Q t . Given {a t i : i ∈ Q t }, the payoff of agent n is
The direct influence of every agent's action on each other's payoff within the same community differentiates this model from most theoretical literature on social learning. In addition to the widely studied informational externalities that arise from sequential observation, there now exists a new parallel economic force, network externalities, that generates an incentive for an agent to conform with her peers. This incentive becomes stronger as the community size grows.
One primary goal of this paper is to ascertain how this incentive affects individual behavior as well as the overall learning level, and whether it improves or impairs the likelihood of agents taking the correct action over time.
After receiving signal s t and before engaging in the above action, the agents may observe some of the actions taken by their predecessors. In this paper, I will discuss two possible structures of observation.
Exogenous observation
The agents in Q t observe the ordered action sequence in a neighborhood B t ⊂ ∪ t−1 i=1 Q i (each agent in Q t observes the same action sequence). The neighborhood B t is generated according to an arbitrary probability distribution G t over the set of all subsets of ∪
B t be the union of all possible neighborhood that can be observed in period t.
I assume that the draws from each G t are independent from each other for all t and from the realization of private signals. The sequence {G t } t∈N + is common knowledge, while the realization of s t and B t are only known by agents in Q t .
Let H t = {a m ∈ {0, 1} : m ∈ B t } denote the set of actions that n can possibly know from observation by herself and others, and let h t be a particular action sequence in H t . Let I t = {s t , h t } be n's information set. Note that the information set of every agent in Q t is the same. The set of all possible information sets of n is denoted as I t .
A strategy for n is a mapping φ t n : I t → {0, 1} which selects a decision for every possible information set. A strategy profile is a sequence of strategies φ = {φ t } t∈N + = {{φ t n } n∈{1,··· ,Q} } t∈N + . I use φ t −n = {φ t n ′ } n ′ =n to denote the strategies of all agents other than n in period t, φ −t = {φ t ′ } t ′ =t to denote the strategies of all agents other than those in Q t , and φ −n,t = (φ t −n , {φ t ′ } t ′ =t ) to denote the strategies of all agents other than n.
Given a strategy profile, the sequence of decisions {a t n } n∈N is a stochastic process. I denote the probability measure generated by this stochastic process as P φ .
Endogenous Observation
The agents in Q t simultaneously acquire information about others' previous decisions from observation. Each agent n can pay a cost c > 0 to obtain a capacity K(t) ∈ N + ; otherwise, he pays nothing and chooses ∅.
, and observe the action of each agent in B(n) t . The actions in B(n) t are observed at the same time, and no agent can choose any additional observation based on what she has already observed. Let B(n) t denote the set of all possible neighborhoods that n can observe. After the agents make their decision on observation, their observations realize and are public information within Q t . That is, every agent in Q t observes B t = ∪ Q n=1 B(n) t . An agent's strategy in the above sequential game consists of two problems: (1) given her private signal, whether to make costly observation and, if yes, whom to observe; (2) after observation (or not), which action to take between 0 and 1 given the observed actions. With a little abuse of notation, let H t = {a m ∈ {0, 1} : m ∈ B ⊂ ∪ t−1 i=1 Q i , |B| ≤ nK(t)} denote the set of actions that n can possibly know from observation by herself and others, and let h t be a particular action sequence in H t . I t = {s t , h t } and I t are defined similarly to above.
A strategy for n is the set of two mappings σ t n = (σ
in a similar fashion to the case of exogenous observation. Given a strategy profile, the sequence of decisions {a t n } n∈N is a stochastic process. I denote the probability measure generated by this stochastic process as P σ .
A decisive difference between exogenous and endogenous observation lies in how observation correlates with signal. Under exogenous observation, no correlation exists between signal and observation because they are simply two independent stochastic processes. Under endogenous observation, however, observation -whether to observe, and if yes, whom to observemay depend on the value of private signal since it is now part of an agent's optimizing decision. Conceivably, for an agent that tries to extract information about the true state from her observation, her inference on private signals and observation of her predecessors, which then partially determines her posterior belief on the state, will be formed very differently under the two observation structures. As shown in later sections of the paper, observation structure has a significant impact on the pattern of social learning.
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
Definition 2. A strategy profile σ * (resp. φ * ) is a pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) if for each t ∈ N + and n ∈ {1, · · · , Q}, σ t * n is such that given σ * −n,t , (1) σ * t,2
(resp. φ * t n (I t )) maximizes the expected payoff of n given every I t ∈ I t ; (2) σ * t,1 n (s t n ) maximizes the expected payoff of n, given every s t n and given σ * t,2 n .
Whether observation is exogenous or endogenous, the idea underlying a PBE is similar:
given all available information and the strategy of each predecessor and each peer, an agent decides her payoff-maximizing strategy. In a model without network externalities, this strategy always coincides with that maximizing the probability of taking the correct action, but here it may not as the value of observed actions (besides their information content) needs to be taken into account as well. An equilibrium strategy under endogenous observation differs from one under exogenous observation in its additional component of observation choice after receiving the private signal. There an agent optimizes her observation according to her signal value and others' strategies.
In the rest of the paper, I simply refer to a PBE as an "equilibrium". Also, in the case of endogenous observation I focus on symmetric equilibria, i.e. for any t, n, σ * t,1
To reflect the relation between an equilibrium and the size of the community, I denote an equilibrium under communities of size Q as σ * (Q) (resp. φ * (Q)). The following result notes a common property of every equilibrium.
Proposition 1.
In every equilibrium σ * (Q) (resp. φ * (Q)) and for every t, actions are always unanimous in Q t : for any I t , σ * t,2
Proposition 1 points out an agent's incentive to conform with her peers in the same community. Note that the posterior belief on the true state is the same across the community, and consider two sub-groups of agents choosing different actions. If an agent choosing action 1 weakly prefers 1 to 0, then it must be the case that each agent choosing 0 strictly prefers 1 to 0. Hence, the only equilibrium action profile is unanimous. At the first sight, this result seems to indicate that network externalities always exacerbates herding and is harmful for learning because there is now additional incentive to ignore one's signal and submit to the majority.
However, this result also implies that agents in a community may conform to an action profile that depends on their signal rather than observation, and hence becomes more informative for successors. As will be shown later, such behavior improves social learning to a great extent.
It is also worth noting that indifference between the two actions can exist in a mixed strategy equilibrium. In fact, when the community size is large, there always exists a mixed strategy equilibrium where an agent's probability of mixing between 1 and 0 depends on the signal value. However, since the mixed strategy equilibrium does not provide additional insight on the relation between social learning and network externalities, I will not discuss it in detail for this paper.
Learning
The main focus of this paper is to determine what type of information aggregation will result from equilibrium behavior. First, I define the different types of learning studied in this paper.
Definition 3. An equilibrium σ * (Q) (resp. φ * (Q)) has asymptotic learning if every agent takes the correct action in the limit:
In this paper, the unconditional probability of taking the correct action, P σ * (Q) (a t n = θ), is also referred to as the learning probability. Asymptotic learning requires that this probability converges to 1, i.e., the posterior beliefs converge to a degenerate distribution on the true state.
In terms of information aggregation, asymptotic learning can be interpreted as equivalent to making all private signals public and thus aggregating information efficiently. It marks the upper bound of social learning with any signal structure and observation structure.
Asymptotic learning may not always be achieved, especially under an endogenous observation structure, because a rational agent may choose not to make costly observation when her 13 signal is already quite precise. In such a case, it is still interesting to see whether information can be efficiently aggregated via observation, i.e. to ask the following question: when an agent decides to observe, will her observation reveal the truth and lead her to act correctly? A formal analysis calls for the notion of truth-telling observation, which is defined below.
Letâ t be a hypothetical action that is equal to the state with higher posterior probability given any I t .
Definition 4. An equilibrium σ * (Q) (resp. φ * (Q)) has truth-telling observation ifâ t = θ whenever observation is non-empty at the limit:
Truth-telling observation is a weaker condition than asymptotic learning in two aspects.
First, it only requires the state-matching action a t to be perfectly correct conditional on nonempty observation as t → ∞, as opposed to the unconditional correct action in asymptotic learning. Second, even in an equilibrium with truth-telling observation, an agent's action conditional on non-empty observation may not coincide with a t . This is because of network externalities: when the community size is large, the agents may conform to an action that matches the state with a probability lower than 1 2 . In contrast, asymptotic learning requires each agent's equilibrium action to be always the same as a t in the limit. Therefore, truth-telling observation should be regarded as a notion describing only the maximum informativeness of observation but not the correctness of equilibrium behavior, while asymptotic learning represents the highest level of both.
Results on Exogenous Observation
In this section and the next, I present the main results of this paper. I organize the results first by observation structure, then by signal structure: this section assumes exogenous observation and shows how the learning pattern is affected by the size of network externalities under unbounded and bounded private beliefs correspondingly. The next section lays out the analysis in a similar fashion, under the more complex environment with endogenous observation. Then by the end of the next section, I provide a summary that compares and contrasts the impact of different factors in the model.
Unbounded Private Beliefs
I start by discussing the benchmark case of unbounded private beliefs. The key issue here is to seek out a condition on observation structure that leads to asymptotic learning. The observation structure, i.e. which predecessors an agent observes, is sometimes referred to as a network in the literature to highlight the connection between theory and application. To better illustrate the formal result, I list below a few examples on typical observation structures:
1. B t = Q 1 for all t: a "star network" where each agent observes and only observes the action of the first agent(s) in the action sequence.
2. B t = Q t−1 : a "line network" where each agent observes only the closest predecessor(s).
3. B t = ∪ t−1 i=1 Q i : a "complete network" where each agent observes every predecessor. This is the upper bound of observational information that can be obtained.
In the analysis of Acemoglu et al. [1] on social learning with only one agent in each period, which is equivalent to Q = 1 in this model, the property of expanding observation is identified to be a necessary and sufficient condition for asymptotic learning. Expanding observation means that as t → ∞, an agent almost surely observes some predecessor that is not too distant.
This predecessor does not have to be in the closest community, nor must an agent observe an arbitrarily large neighborhood. With the presence of network externalities, the relation between asymptotic learning and expanding observation remains unchanged. The following proposition states the formal result.
Proposition 2. For all Q, there exists an equilibrium with asymptotic learning if and only if there is expanding observation:
The mathematical expression of expanding observation is another representation of the verbal description given above. If for an arbitrary K, an agent at a sufficiently late period in time always observes some predecessor that moves later than period K, it essentially implies that the agent always observes at least one close (but not necessarily the closest) predecessor.
To interpret this result, note that in this strategic environment there are two potential obstacles to asymptotic learning. The first is the incentive for herding, which has been studied by much of the previous literature; the second is the incentive for conforming to an action that does not make the best use of all available information (signal and observation), which only appears with the existence of network externalities introduced in this paper.
There is a noteworthy trade-off between the two incentives: if agents are more likely to take their observation into account for a more accurate action, it exacerbates herding but alleviates the chances of conforming to a worse action; on the contrary, if agents ignore their observation more often, they make less informed decisions but herding behavior is suppressed.
To achieve asymptotic learning, actions must be correct in the limit, and therefore the only possible candidate for such an equilibrium is one where agents always act according to both their signal and observation, at least after some threshold in time. Since private beliefs are unbounded, it is always possible for an agent to receive a signal that is arbitrarily informative about the state. Therefore, however accurate a predecessor's action is, there is always a positive probability that the agent's signal value is so extreme that she chooses to believe her signal over observation. In other words, the herding incentive never induces an agent to abandon every possible signal. On the other hand, expanding observation ensures that there is an infinite chain of strict improvement over time on the learning probability, which ultimately brings this probability up to 1 in the limit.
The previous examples of observation structure clearly demonstrate the above argument.
In the first example, asymptotic learning cannot occur because even though every agent at any t > 1 can obtain a higher learning probability than agents in Q 1 , the learning probability does not increase over time -agents at any different t, t ′ > 1 are essentially identical. In the other two example, asymptotic learning is possible. Each agent can do at least as well as her immediate predecessor(s) by simply following their action; in the equilibrium specified above, they are actually strictly better-off than the predecessor(s) they observe, because of the possible very informative signals generated by unbounded private beliefs. Hence, the learning probability increases over time and converges to 1.
Bounded Private Beliefs
With bounded private beliefs, the same kind of individual equilibrium behavior may lead to a complete contrast in terms of social learning. For instance, the action profile that always makes the best use of available information results in asymptotic learning under unbounded private beliefs, but causes herding under bounded private beliefs. The reason is that when some observed predecessor's action is informative enough to overwhelm the most extreme signal, an agent will just discard her private information and herd with predecessors. It is here that network externalities start to be useful for improving social learning: the incentive to conform counterbalances the incentive to herd, making it possible for agents to still use some of their private information even in the presence of very informative observation. In turn, their own actions become informative for successors and thus a chain of learning improvement can once more be established.
In this section, I impose some additional assumptions on the observation structure to obtain sharp results. Denoting agent n in period t ′ as n t ′ , I say that an agent in period t > t ′ has complete observation of n t ′ if B t ⊃B t ′ , and that the observation structure has infinite complete observations if lim t→∞ G t (|{n t ′ : t has complete observation of n t ′ }| > K) = 1 for all K ∈ N + .
An agent having complete observation of a predecessor means that she does not only observes the predecessor's action, but also observes actions that can be observed by the predecessor. A typical example of infinite complete observations is the third example of observation structure listed before: each agent gets to observe the entire action history.
I now state the main theoretical result of this section.
Theorem 1.
The following results hold:
1. When Q = 1, there exists no equilibrium with truth-telling observation if {G t } t∈N satisfies one of the following conditions:
-b. there exists some constant M such that |B t | ≤ M for all t.
2. Assume that the observation structure has infinite complete observations. There existŝ Q such that for any ǫ > 0 and for all Q ≥Q, there exists an equilibrium φ * (Q) such that:
(1) truth-telling observation occurs; (2) lim t→∞ P φ * (Q) (a t n = θ) > 1 − ǫ.
Result (1) has been noted in much of the previous literature. As mentioned above, truthtelling observation is impossible due to the inevitable arising of herding behavior, as there is no way to restrain the herding incentive when each community is a singleton. Nevertheless, result (2) shows that network externalities can serve as an economic force that counters the herding incentive, in a way which hurts an individual agent ceteris paribus but benefits social learning. When the community size is large, the signal can be regarded as a correlating device to coordinate the agents in the same community to conform to an action based on the signal value only. This action may sometimes be different from the more "informed" action based on both signal and observation, but it does constitute mutual best responses and it makes the action of this community informative for successors.
Following the rough intuition above, I now present a heuristic proof of result (2) in Theorem 1 (the complete proof with technical details can be found in the Appendix). First, properties of Bayes' update determine that whichever the true state is, an agent's posterior probability on the wrong state can never get arbitrarily close to 1 over time, because otherwise the same set of observation inducing this posterior probability must occur with > 1 probability when the true state is altered, which is a contradiction.
Next, I construct an equilibrium where each observed action is informative. Consider an action profile which follows observation -that is, choose the action matching the state with higher probability given observation only -when the signal is weak, and follows signal when the signal is strong. This constitutes mutual best responses when Q is large because the incentive to conform becomes stronger than the incentive to match the state. In this equilibrium, strong private signals are never abandoned. As a result, for an agent that has complete observation of another agent following such an action profile, Bayes' update from observing this additional action will induce a posterior belief in favor of the corresponding state, as compared to the belief without adding this observation. This claim implies a more important property of equilibrium behavior: following any belief on the state, additional observation of sufficiently many actions of the same value can induce a new belief which puts a higher probability on the corresponding state.
Now we are ready to prove truth-telling observation. Note that the hypothetical actionâ t can be regarded as the optimal action form some outside singleton agent who observes B t and tries to maximize her probability of matching the state. Suppose that truth-telling observation does not occur, which implies that her highest learning probability is equal to some ρ < 1. Fix a sufficiently large t ′ such that observing B t ′ gives her a ≈ ρ probability of matching the state, and consider another sufficiently large number ∆ and the following sub-optimal strategy: given the action sequence in B t ′ , she will change her action if and only if she observes ∆ consecutive additional actions that are the same value, which opposes the action she would have taken by observing only B t ′ . It can be shown that this sub-optimal strategy already improves her learning probability by a significant amount, which makes the total probability exceed ρ, a contradiction. It is worth noting that the result is not obtained by the law of large numbers, because observed actions are not mutually independent: later actions are affected by earlier ones via agents' action profiles which are signal-dependent. Instead, this strict improvement stems from calculating the difference between the probabilities of the ∆ actions being "helpful"
(in the sense that they correct a wrong belief) and "harmful" (in the sense that they mislead a correct belief), the details of which are given in the Appendix.
Finally, I identify a direct inverse relation between the limit learning probability and the probability of agents acting according to signal only. Truth-telling observation implies that at the limit, the probability of taking the correct action conditional on non-empty observation is equal to 1; hence the total learning probability at the limit is the sum of the probability that agents take their observation into account, and the probability that a strong signal occurs favoring the true state. The cutoff for a strong signal is arbitrary -as long as each agent uses her signal for a fixed positive probability, truth-telling observation occurs. Hence, the higher this cutoff, the more likely an agent chooses her action according to observation, and thus the higher the learning probability. In this way, any learning probability that is less than 1 can be obtained in equilibrium.
Results on Endogenous Observation
In this section, I analyze the model under endogenous observation. Note that costly and strategic observation creates an independent economic force by itself: it discourages an agent from observation when her signal is quite informative, because the additional benefit from observation becomes small or even negligible. With this added strategic component, the effect of network externalities becomes more subtle, but in general a similar implication can be derived: with sufficiently large network externalities, the level of social learning can be improved.
Unbounded Private Beliefs
Singleton Communities
To fully understand how network externalities change the pattern of learning, it is important to first understand how singleton agents behave when observation is endogenous, which very little previous literature has studied. The following result shows that equilibrium individual decisions regarding whether to observe can be represented by an interval on the support of private signal.
Proposition 3. In every equilibrium σ * (1), for every t ∈ N:
2. P σ * (1) (a t = θ|s t ) is weakly increasing (weakly decreasing) in s t for all non-negative (non-positive) s t such that σ * t,1 (s t ) = ∅.
3. There is one and only one signal s t
Observation is more favorable for an agent with a weaker signal, which is intuitive because information acquired from observation is relatively more important when an agent is less confident about her private information. The proposition then shows that for an agent in period t, there is one and only one non-negative cut-off signal in [0, 1], which is denoted as s t * , such that she will choose to observe in equilibrium if |s t | ∈ [0, s t * ) and not to observe if |s t | > s t * .
The second implication of this proposition is that the learning probability (i.e., the probability of taking the correct action) has a nice property of monotonicity when the agent observes a non-empty neighborhood. When she chooses not to observe, i.e., when s t > s t * (s t < −s t * ), the probability of taking the correct action is also increasing (decreasing) in s t because the probability is simply equal to +f 1 (s t ) ). However, this monotonicity is not preserved from observing to not observing because observation is costly and an agent with a stronger signal may be content with a lower learning probability to save on costs. The following figure illustrates these findings. 
2. There is truth-telling observation in σ * (1) if and only if lim t→∞ K(t) = ∞.
3. When there is truth-telling observation, lim t→∞ P σ * (1) (a t = θ) = F 0 (s * ) where s * is characterized by
The generic uniqueness of σ * (1) is obtained by an inductive argument: starting from period 1, each agent faces a discrete choice in observation as well as in action. Since the agent's objective is to maximize her probability of taking the correct action, in general there is a unique solution to the optimal decision in both. Proceeding inductively, the unique equilibrium can be determined.
20
The property of truth-telling observation also holds in the case of exogenous observation with unbounded private beliefs, but the underlying mechanism here is much different. Under exogenous observation, an agent always uses her private information for a positive probability (which converges to 0 over time) because her signal is strong enough to overwhelm the realized observation. Under endogenous observation, an agent may choose to user her private information
and not observe at all because even though observation can still be beneficial, its marginal benefit in information does not cover the cost. This probability of no observation does not converges to 0 over time. As a result, an agent's individual action is always erroneous with a probability bounded away from 0, which then implies that observing any finite sequence of actions does not reveal the true state no matter when the actions take place. In other words, truth-telling observation never occurs when lim t→∞ K(t) = ∞. On the other hand, this individual error is exactly the source of informativeness: because an agent sometimes chooses to forgo the (potentially more informative) observation, her action is indicative of the range of signal she receives. Therefore once an agent observes an arbitrarily large neighborhood, information can be aggregated efficiently to reveal the true state. Once again, this does not follow from the law of large numbers, but an argument of continuing strict improvement similar to that in Theorem 1.
In terms of the limit learning probability, it is straight forward that F 0 (s * ) is the largest possible learning probability in equilibrium, and it is only achievable when truth-telling observation occurs. After all, it is impossible in any equilibrium for any agent to choose to observe when her signal is not in [−s * , s * ]. Hence we can conclude that with unbounded private beliefs, endogenous observation lowers the limit learning probability as compared to exogenous observation with expanding observations. However, endogenous observation may lead to a higher limit learning probability than exogenous observation with non-expanding observations, because even though agents will not observe given extreme signals, they make more informed choices when they do observe. For instance, consider the "star network" in the previous example of observation structures. It can be shown that if observation is endogenous and K(t) = 1, each agent will observe their immediate predecessor whenever they choose to observe, and the limit learning probability is higher than that in the "star network" when c is low.
Non-Singleton Communities
In this section I present the main result in non-singleton communities, and compare it with the one on singleton communities above.
Theorem 3. There existsQ such that for all Q ≥Q, there exists an equilibrium σ * (Q) with asymptotic learning.
Before elaborating on this result, it is useful to first describe such an equilibrium that leads to asymptotic learning. For agent in the same community Q t , consider two action profiles: a "truthseeking" one where agents conform to the action that matches the state with higher probability according to all available information; and a sub-optimal one where they act otherwise -for example they conform to the action that is worse for matching the state. It is clear that the first one yields a higher payoff for every agent in expectation. Now consider the following strategy profile for observation and action: agent 1 observes a prescribed neighborhood (which is generically unique) given s t , and no other agent observes. If the realized observed neighborhood turns out to be the same as the prescribed one, then the agents follow the "truth-seeking" action profile; otherwise, they follow the sub-optimal one.
When the community size is large, both action profiles constitute best responses, which then by backward induction implies that making the prescribed observation is indeed for agent 1. Hence we have an equilibrium where observation of an arbitrary non-empty neighborhood occurs regardless of signal value. By imposing the property of expanding observations on this sequence of observed neighborhood (for example, agent 1 in each period observes agent 1 in the previous period), we can apply Proposition 1 to obtain asymptotic learning.
This result identifies an effect on strategic observation that is imposed by network externalities: more observation can be encouraged as the community size grows. In the above described equilibrium, by conforming to different actions according to the observed neighborhood, the agents essentially make it more costly for agent 1 not to observe, and hence expands the range of signal for which agent 1 will observe the prescribed neighborhood. When the community size gets sufficiently large, this range of signal becomes the whole support S, and hence an unbroken chain of observation is established even when observation is costly. As a result, the efficient aggregation of information is restored.
From the construction of equilibrium, we can also see that the result is robust to the specific cost structure of observation. In a more general model, let c t (k) denote a cost function for observing k predecessors in period t. As long as c t (1) has a constant upper bound, Theorem 3
can be applied to show that asymptotic learning can occur in equilibrium.
Bounded Private Beliefs
When private beliefs are bounded and only a finite-size neighborhood can be observed in the limit, the level of social learning is always bounded away from 1 due to either herding or a persisting probability of error 2 . Therefore in this section, I assume that lim t→∞ K(t) = ∞ to show a sharp contrast between learning with and without network externalities.
As in the previous section, I first discuss the effect of endogenous observation on learning in an environment where agents are singletons. It turns out that the limit learning probability can be affected in either direction: whether it goes up or down compared with exogenous observation depends greatly on the value of c, the cost of observation. The following example illustrates this result and its underlying mechanism without loss of generality.
Assume that Q = 1. Consider the following two cases: exogenous observation where B t = {1, · · · , t − 1}, and endogenous observation where K(t) = t − 1. It is an established result in the literature (see e.g. Smith and Sorensen [33] , Acemoglu et al. [1] ) that when observation is exogenous, the limit learning probability has an upper boundP < 1 and a lower bound P > F 0 (0). In other words, at the limit an agent does better than just following her own signal, but cannot learn the true state perfectly.
Under endogenous observation, Theorem 2 can be extended here to characterize the limit learning probability for a range of the cost c. Note that unbounded private beliefs is a sufficient but not necessary condition for the proof of Theorem 1. In fact, truth-telling observation only requires beliefs to be "strong" relative to cost, i.e. lim s→1
In other words, as long as an agent prefers not to observe -even if observation reveals the truthwhen her signal takes the most extreme value, the necessary and sufficient relation between truth-telling observation and infinite observation at the limit can be derived, following the same argument as before. Hence, when c > 1 − lim s→1 f 1 (s) f 1 (s)+f 0 (s) , letting s(c) be characterized by f 1 (s(c)) f 1 (s(c))+f 0 (s(c)) = 1 − c, we have an expression for the limit learning probability denoted P (c):
Depending on c, the value of s(c) ranges from 0 to arbitrarily close to 1. As a result, the value of P (c) ranges from F 0 (0) to arbitrarily close to 1. We see here that endogenous observation affects social learning in a way monotonic in c: compared to exogenous observation, endogenous observation is better for social learning when c is relatively large and worse for social learning when c is relatively small. Now I state the main result on network externalities. It shows that regardless of the value of c, network externalities facilitate learning in the sense that it increases the highest possible learning probability in equilibrium.
Theorem 4. There existsQ such that for any ǫ > 0 and for all Q ≥Q, there exists an equilibrium σ * (Q) such that: (1) truth-telling observation occurs; (2) lim t→∞ P σ * (Q) (a t n = θ) > 1 − ǫ.
This result can be derived from a combination of Theorems 2 and 3. First by Theorem 3, agents can be incentivized to observe a prescribed neighborhood given any signal; then by Theorem 2, when the prescribed neighborhood is observed, the signal serves as a correlation device for the agents to coordinate on an action profile, which takes into account all available information with a certain probability. This probability can be made arbitrarily close to 1.
Consequently, for any fixed observation cost c, when the community size is large there is always an equilibrium with a higher learning probability than that under singleton communities. When private beliefs are bounded, the benchmark case typically produces a learning probability bounded away from 1, no matter whether agents observe close or distant predecessors.
Summary
Making observation endogenous can make this probability either higher or lower, depending on the observation cost c. With network externalities, the highest possible learning probability increases for any value of c when the community size is sufficiently large; in particular, it can be arbitrarily close to 1 in equilibrium. The following figure illustrates these scenarios. 
Random Community Size
In many applications, the community size Q is not constant over time. In this section, I demonstrate how the model can be generalized to account for a more variable environment with random community size.
Instead of a fixed Q, assume that at the beginning of each period, the community size Q(t) is randomly selected from a commonly known probability distribution H on N + , with E[Q(t)] < ∞.
The Q(t)'s are independent and identically distributed over time. Q(t) is common knowledge for agents in Q t before they receive s t . I refer to this environment as the random community size model. Whether Q(t) can be observed by agents after period t or not, the main results derived before generalize to this model. This result implies that, for network externalities to have all the previously described effects on social learning, all the communities do not have to be large. Instead, it suffices to have infinitely many communities of large size over time. The intuition for this generalization is that as long as agents use some of their private information conditional on a large community, their action still conveys some valuable information to successors, whether or not their realized community size can be observed.
Equilibrium Selection and Risk Dominance
The conforming incentive generated by network externalities results in multiple equilibria in an environment with large communities. Our many of my previous results are built on the fact that conforming on the most informed action and on a less informed action are both best responses for agents in the same community, which does not happen when agents are singletons because one's unique best response then would be to use all available information. A natural question then is whether different equilibria can be compared in any way, and if yes, whether a selected equilibrium by any criterion changes the implication on having network externalities in the model. In this section, I propose risk dominance as an equilibrium selection method and discuss its properties and impact. In particular, this criterion is imposed on the interim stage where signal and observation have been realized: it essentially enables comparison between two action profiles and selects a unique equilibrium action for each information set.
Consider any Q t and any information set I t . Let a t (I t ) = {a t n (I t )} Q n=1 and a ′ t (I t ) = {a ′ t n (I t )} Q n=1 denote two arbitrary action profiles with unanimous action. Let v t n (a t (I t ), I t ) denote agent n's expected payoff given a t (I t ) and I t .
Definition 5. I say that a t (I t ) risk dominates a ′ t (I t ) if for any Q ′ t ⊂ Q t and any n ∈ Q ′ t , we have
If a t (I t ) risk dominates any other action profile for any I t , we say that a t (I t ) is risk dominant.
The idea behind risk dominance is the following: suppose that a subset of agents Q ′ t ⊂ Q t switch their action from a given profile to an alternative one. If action profile 1 risk dominates action profile 2, the expected loss for every agent in Q ′ t in switching from action profile 1 to 2 is always larger than that in switching from 2 to 1, for every possible Q ′ t and information set I t . One interpretation of risk dominance is that it indicates an agent's preference for one action profile over the other when she is not sure about which one to be played by others in her community.
An intuitive candidate for a risk dominant action profile is the one in which each agent makes the best use of I t , to which I give a formal definition below. As it turns out, this is the generically unique risk dominant action profile.
Definition 6. An action profile is truth-seeking if for every t, n and I t , n chooses the action that maximizes the probability of a t n = θ given I t .
Proposition 5. The truth-seeking action profile is risk dominant.
It is easy to see that the truth-seeking action profile yields the highest possible expected payoff for every agent in Q t given I t . In fact, if we fix the number of agents that take a given action a, each agent's payoff is the highest when a is truth-seeking. Hence, given a subset Q ′ t of action-switching agents, their loss is always less when switching from some other action profile to the truth-seeking one than the opposite. I call an equilibrium with the truth-seeking profile a truth-seeking equilibrium, and denote it as φ * T (Q) and σ * T (Q) under exogenous and endogenous observation respectively. Now we begin to inspect how learning in this particular equilibrium changes according to the community size.
When observation is exogenous, network externalities have no effect on the general learning pattern in a truth-seeking equilibrium: regardless of Q, asymptotic learning occurs if private beliefs are unbounded and the observation structure has expanding observations, and does not occur otherwise 3 . The truth-seeking action profile prevents agents from conforming to a less informed action that uses more or their private information, and hence the whole community acts as a single agent that tries her best to match her action with the true state. The conforming incentive does not alter anything in agents' behavior however large a community gets.
When observation is endogenous, however, network externalities still play an important role on learning in a truth-seeking equilibrium. I first state a formal general result assuming unbounded private beliefs and infinite observations (lim t→∞ K(t) = ∞).
is characterized by the following equation:
In a truth-seeking equilibrium, network externalities still encourages agents to observe, but not because no observation or "wrong" observation entails them to conform to a sub-optimal action as in the previous results, but because observation brings a larger expected benefit in a larger community. As a result, the range of signals leading to non-empty observation becomes larger, while the truth-telling property of observation is preserved. Therefore a larger community size raises the limit learning probability but the incremental improvement becomes smaller in σ * T (Q) than in the constructed equilibrium in Section 5, because asymptotic learning does not occur in σ * T (Q) for any given Q. Nevertheless, this difference disappears when Q goes to infinity. When private beliefs are bounded, network externalities can work in opposite directions.
As argued in Section 5, in σ * T (Q) truth-telling observation occurs whenever private beliefs are "strong" relative to cost, i.e. when the payoff of simply following an extreme signal exceeds that of knowing the true state by costly observation. Similar to the above proposition, the first payoff can be written as Q(
while the second payoff is Qū − c, which implies that the marginal effect of increasing Q is higher in the latter. We can then conclude that increasing Q is better for social learning when private beliefs remain "strong", because once again it encourages observation which is still truth-telling. However, it hurts social learning when private beliefs become weak because the informativeness of observation may now overwhelm that of any private signal and induces herding.
Negative Externalities
Network externalities are not always positive as in the main sections of this paper. In some cases there may be a "congestion effect" on action, i.e. more agents choosing the same action results in less payoff for each agent. For instance, too many customers squeezing in a restaurant will probably cause a bad dining experience in waiting time and noise level, even if the restaurant is superior to its competitors in food quality. Consequently, a customer may actually prefer another restaurant with ordinary food but less crowded.
In this section, I show how the model developed above can be used to analyze negative externalities and its impact on learning. Assume that the payoff of an agent n ∈ Q t takes the following form:
, otherwise.
For community Q t , let P denote an arbitrary posterior probability that the true state is 1
given their signal and observation. In any equilibrium, the number of agents choosing action 1, denoted Q 1 , must satisfy
Combining these two inequalities, we have
From the above expression, we can see that in any equilibrium under any signal structure and observation structure, the more informed action will always be taken by at least half of the agents. Moreover, as the community size gets larger, one can make more and more precise inference on the agents' posterior belief from observing all the actions in the community. Then if observation is exogenous and more or less "complete", i.e. at least in the limit an agent observes almost the entire action history, the learning pattern is similar to that with singleton communities. Asymptotic learning occurs when private beliefs are unbounded but never occurs otherwise.
When observation is endogenous, a natural conjecture is that negative externalities discourage observation, and it is confirmed by the model. As Q increases, the marginal benefit from observation shrinks because the equilibrium actions are always split in certain proportions between 0 and 1. Hence, even though truth-telling observation still occurs if infinite observations can be made at the limit, the range of signals under which observation is non-empty is narrowed by negative network externalities. Moreover, a "tragedy of commons" argument implies that more precise knowledge about the true state may actually decrease the total payoff in a community and hence raises the issue of discrepancy between equilibrium and efficiency, but I
will not delve further into it in this paper.
Conclusion
In this paper, I studied the problem of Bayesian learning with network externalities in various signal and observation structures. There has been a large and growing literature on social learning focusing on whether equilibria lead to efficient information aggregation, but most of If private beliefs are bounded, for most common observation schemes the probability of learning is bounded away from 1 when the community size is small, but it can get arbitrarily close to asymptotic learning when the community size is larger than a certain threshold. Network externalities reduce herding and improve social learning in this case.
When observation is endogenous, network externalities also help to achieve better social learning but in a very different way. With a small community size, asymptotic learning never occurs because agents do not always observe: when the private signal is strong, it is not worthwhile to pay the observation cost for a small marginal expected benefit. However, when the community size gets large, network externalities encourage observation even when the private signal is strong because the marginal benefit from observation increases with the number of agents in a community. Therefore, asymptotic learning (or almost asymptotic learning) occurs even when observation is costly.
I also discussed the issue of equilibrium selection, and proposed risk dominance as a selection criterion for the action profile after both signal and observation realize. In the selected equilibria, network externalities do not affect learning at all when observation is exogenous, have a positive effect on learning when observation is endogenous and private beliefs are bounded, and may impose either a positive or a negative influence on learning when observation is endogenous and private beliefs are bounded.
Beyond the specific results presented in this paper, I believe that the framework developed
here can be applied to analyze the learning dynamics in a more general and complex environment. The following questions are among those that can be studied in future work using this framework: (1) equilibrium learning when agents' preferences are heterogeneous, both over time and within a community; (2) The effect of network externalities when agents in the same community make sequential decisions; (3) equilibrium learning when the size of network externalities depends on the true state.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose that there exist some σ * (Q) and I t such that in Q t , Q ′ ∈
(1, Q) agents choose action 1 and the others choose action 0 in equilibrium. Let P = P σ (θ = 1|I t ), for every agent that choose action 1 we have
For every agent that choose action 0 we have
Rearranging the above two inequalities, we have
Combining the inequalities yields
which is a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 2. The following lemma is useful: Lemma 1. There existsQ such that for any Q ≥Q and for any I t , any action profile with unanimous action constitutes mutual best responses in Q t .
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that every agent in Q t chooses action 1 given I t . Let P denote the probability that θ = 1 given I t . For each agent, her expected payoff from action 1 is Q(Pū + (1 − P )u), while her payoff from action 0 is P u + (1 − P )ū. For any P ∈ (0, 1), as long as Q ≥ū u , the agent's expected payoff from action 1 is higher. Hence, the action profile with unanimous action constitutes mutual best responses.
Consider the action profile such that given any I t , each agent in Q t chooses the action that matches the true state with higher probability. Following the above lemma and the main result in Acemoglu et al. (2011) , this action profile constitutes an equilibrium with asymptotic learning.
Proof of Theorem 1. Result (1) follows from Acemoglu et al. (2011) . Now I prove result (2) by assuming that B t = ∪ t=1 i=1 Q i , to avoid technical redundancy. The argument below applies to any other observation structure with infinite complete observations. First, I establish a few lemmas.
Given an equilibrium φ * (Q), let B k = ∪ k i=1 Q k , and consider any agent who observes B k . Let R B k φ * (Q) be the random variable of the posterior belief on the true state being 1, given each decision in B k . For each realized belief R B k φ * (Q) = r, we say that a realized private signal s and decision sequence h in B k induce r if P φ * (Q) (θ = 1|h, s) = r.
Lemma 2. In any equilibrium φ * (Q) For either state θ = 0, 1 and for any s ∈ S, we have
Proof. I prove here that lim ǫ→0 + (lim sup k→∞ P φ * (Q) (R B k φ * (Q) > 1 − ǫ|0, s)) = 0, and the second equality would follow from an analogous argument. Suppose the equality does not hold, then s ∈ S and ρ > 0 exist such that for any ǫ > 0 and any N ∈ N, k > N exists such that
Consider any realized action sequence h ǫ from B k that, together with s, induces some r > 1 − ǫ, and let H ǫ denote the set of all such action sequences; thus, we know that
The above two conditions imply that
For sufficiently small ǫ, we have
> 1, which is a contradiction.
Lemma 3. There existsQ such that for all Q ≥Q, there exists an equilibrium φ * (Q) such that: given any realized belief r ∈ (0, 1) on state 1 for an agent observing B k , for anyr ∈ (0, r) (r ∈ (r, 1)), N (r,r, Q) ∈ N exists such that a realized belief that is less thanr (higher than r) can be induced by observing additional N (r,r, Q) consecutive communities with unanimous action 0 (1).
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume thatr ∈ (0, r). We know that there is a private signal s and an action sequence h from B k such that
.
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Let a k+1 = 0 denote the event that unanimous action 0 occurs in Q k+1 . The new belief would then be
. Now I explicitly describe an equilibrium φ * (Q) that will prove the result. Consider the following strategy profile for agents in an arbitrary community Q t :
1. Fix some ǫ > 0. Let s(ǫ) be such that 1 − F 1 (s(ǫ)) = ǫ. An agent takes action 1 if s t ≥ s(ǫ) and action 0 if s t ≤ −s(ǫ).
2. Otherwise, an agent takes the action that matches the state with higher probability according to observation only.
By Lemma 1, when Q is sufficiently large both (1) and (2) constitute mutual best responses given I t . Hence the above strategy profile is an equilibrium. I let q(r o ) ∈ {0, 1} denote the action taken according to (2) .
Given the action sequence h from B k , an agent can compute r o . Now we have
By symmetry of the signal structure, F 0 (s(ǫ)) − F 0 (−s(ǫ)) = F 1 (s(ǫ)) − F 1 (−s(ǫ)) and
Hence we know that the ratio
has a < 1 upper bound which is independent of r o (and hence h). Let y denote this bound and we have
Note that the expression on the right-hand side above is decreasing in r. Let r m denote the belief induced by h ∪ {a k+1 , · · · , a k+m } where a k+1 = · · · = a k+m = 0. We have
Because r 1 r = 1 r+(1−r) 1 y < 1, we can find the desired N (r,r, Q) for anyr ∈ (0, r), such that a realized belief that is less thanr can be induced by s and h ∪ {a k+1 , · · · , a k+N (r,r,Q) }, where a k+1 = · · · = a k+N (r,r,Q) = 0.
Lemma 4. Consider the φ * (Q) constructed above. Letâ be the action that matches the state with higher probability given s and every action in B k , and let P B k φ * (Q) (â = θ|s) denote the probability thatâ does not match the state. We have lim k→∞ P B k φ * (Q) (â = θ|s) = 0. 34 Proof. Suppose not, then noting that P B k φ * (Q) (â = θ|s) must be weakly decreasing in k, it follows that lim k→∞ P B k φ * (Q) (â = θ|s) > 0. Let ρ > 0 denote this limit. From Lemma 2, we know that for any α > 0 and for either true state θ = 0, 1, z ∈ [
Then, for any δ > 0, we can find a sufficiently large k such that for any
By Lemma 3, for any π > 0, N (π) = max{N (z,
, Q)} ∈ N exists such that whenever θ = 0 and R , z], and a k+1 = · · · = a k+N (π) = 1. Let h denote a decision sequence from B k that, together with s, induces such a posterior belief in the former case, and let h ′ denote a decision sequence from B k that, together with s, induces such a posterior belief in the latter case. Let H and H ′ denote the sets of such decision sequences correspondingly. We have
From the proof of Lemma 3, we know that for every h,
which implies that
From the proof of Lemma 3, we know that the quantities P φ * (Q) (a k+1 = 0|h, 1) and P φ * (Q) (a k+1 = 1|h, 0) have a > 0 lower bound which is independent of h. Denote this bound by w, and the above inequality can be written as
By the definition of h, we have
Similarly, we have
and
From the previous construction, we know that
Combining the previous inequalities, we have
From the previous construction, we also know that
Clearly, for some given π > 0, a sufficiently small δ exists such that πw N (π) 1 2 ρ > δ, which implies a contradiction.
Lemma 4 implies that in the equilibrium φ * (Q) constructed in Lemma 3, truth-telling observation occurs. Then we can compute the probability of taking the state-matching action:
Since ǫ can take any value on (0, 1], simply let ǫ = 1−P 1−F 0 (0) and we have the desired equation lim t→∞ P φ * (Q) (a t n = θ) = P .
Proof of Theorem 2. Result (1) follows from the fact that each agent always makes a decision among finite options. Given an indifference-breaking rule, the equilibrium is unique. Now I prove result (2) by establishing the following lemmas.
Lemma 5. In every equilibrium σ * (1), for all t ∈ N, s t * < s * .
Proof. The definition of s * implies that when agent t has a private signal of s * , he is indifferent between paying c to know the true state and choosing accordingly, and paying nothing and choosing 1. Note that the largest possible benefit from observing is always strictly less than knowing the true state with certainty. Hence, the (positive) private signal that makes agent n indifferent between observing and not observing must be less than s * .
Given an equilibrium σ * (1), let B k = ∪ k i=1 Q k , and consider any agent who observes B k . Let R B k σ * (1) be the random variable of the posterior belief on the true state being 1, given each decision in B k . For each realized belief R B k σ * (1) = r, we say that a realized private signal s and decision sequence h in B k induce r if P σ * (1) (θ = 1|h, s) = r.
Lemma 6. Given any realized belief r ∈ (0, 1) on state 1 for an agent observing B k , for anŷ r ∈ (0, r) (r ∈ (r, 1)), N (r,r) ∈ N exists such that a realized belief that is less thanr (higher thanr) can be induced by additional N (r,r) consecutive observations of action 0 (1) in any equilibrium.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume thatr ∈ (0, r). We know that there is a private signal s and an action sequence h from B k such that r = P σ * (1) (h|1)f 1 (s) P σ * (1) (h|1)f 1 (s) + P σ * (1) (h|0)f 0 (s) .
Consider h ∪ {a k+1 } where a k+1 = 0. The new belief would then be r 1 = P σ * (1) (h|1)f 1 (s) × P σ * (1) (a k+1 = 0|h, 1) P σ * (1) (h|1)f 1 (s) × P σ * (1) (a k+1 = 0|h, 1) + P σ * (1) (h|0)f 0 (s) × P σ * (1) (a k+1 = 0|h, 0) .
Note that
P σ * (1) (a k+1 = 0|h, 1) = F 1 (−s k+1 * ) + P σ * (1) (a k+1 = 0, observe|h, 1) P σ * (1) (a k+1 = 0|h, 0) = F 0 (−s k+1 * ) + P σ * (1) (a k+1 = 0, observe|h, 0), and that P In any equilibrium, note that P σ * (1) (a k+1 = 0, |h, 1, s k+1 ) = P σ * (1) (a k+1 = 0, |h, 0, s k+1 ) for any given h and s k+1 ∈ [−s k+1 * , s k+1 * ]. Moreover, given any s k+1 ∈ [0, s k+1 * ], P σ * (1) (a k+1 = 0, |h, 1, s k+1 ) and P σ * (1) (a k+1 = 0, |h, 0, s k+1 ) are either 0 or 1.
For any s k+1 ∈ [0, s k+1 * ], note that in a symmetric equilibrium, agent k + 1 observes the same neighborhood, given private signal s k+1 and −s k+1 . Hence, if k + 1 chooses 1 with private signal −s k+1 , then he will also choose 1 with private signal s k+1 ; if k + 1 chooses 0 with private signal s k+1 , then he will also choose 0 with private signal −s k+1 . Together with the assumptions of symmetric signal structure and the MLRP, which imply that f 1 (−s k+1 ) = f 0 (s k+1 ) ≤ f 1 (s k+1 ) = f 0 (−s k+1 ), it then follows that P σ * (1) (a k+1 = 0, |h, 1, s k+1 )f 1 (s k+1 ) + P σ * (1) (a k+1 = 0, |h, 1, −s k+1 )f 1 (−s k+1 )
≤P σ * (1) (a k+1 = 0, |h, 0, s k+1 )f 0 (s k+1 ) + P σ * (1) (a k+1 = 0, |h, 0, −s k+1 )f 0 (−s k+1 ).
Therefore, we have P σ * (1) (a k+1 = 0, observe|h, 0) ≥ P σ * (1) (a k+1 = 0, observe|h, 1). Together with Lemma 5, we have P σ * (1) (a k+1 = 0|h, 1)
The second inequality is based on the fact that F 1 (s * ) − F 1 (−s * ) = F 0 (s * ) − F 0 (−s * ) by the symmetry of the signal structure. Therefore, we have r r 1 = 1 + P σ * (1) (h|0)f 0 (s) P σ * (1) (h|1)f 1 (s) P σ * (1) (a k+1 =0|h,0) P σ * (1) (a k+1 =0|h,1)
+
P σ * (1) (h|0)f 0 (s) P σ * (1) (h|1)f 1 (s) =r + (1 − r) P σ * (1) (a k+1 = 0|h, 0) P σ * (1) (a k+1 = 0|h, 1) > r + (1 − r) F 0 (s * ) F 1 (s * ) .
Note that the expression on the right-hand side above is decreasing in r. Let r m denote the belief induced by h ∪ {a k+1 , · · · , a k+m } where a k+1 = · · · = a k+m = 0. We have < 1, we can find the desired N (r,r) for anyr ∈ (0, r), such that a realized belief that is less thanr can be induced by s and h ∪ {a k+1 , · · · , a k+N (r,r) }, where a k+1 = · · · = a k+N (r,r) = 0. Lemma 7. Given any equilibrium σ * (1) and any private signal s ∈ (−s * , s * ), letâ be the action that a rational agent would take after observing s and every action in B k , and let P B k σ * (1) (â = θ|s) denote the probability of taking the wrong action. Then we have lim k→∞ P B k σ * (1) (â = θ|s) = 0.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Lemma 4.
Lemma 7 implies truth-telling observation. Finally, result (3) follows from (2) and the fact that in the limit an agent will observe if and only if her private signal lies in (−s * , s * ).
Proof of Theorem 3. Consider the following strategy profile σ(Q) for agents in an arbitrary community Q t :
1. Given any s t , agent 1 observes a t−1 1 , and no other agent makes any observation.
2. If h t = {a t−1 1 }, then each agent in Q t takes the action that matches the state with higher probability according to I t . Otherwise, each agent takes the opposite action (the action that matches the state with lower probability).
By Lemma 1, the action profile given I t specified above constitutes mutual best responses when Q is sufficiently large. If h t = {a t−1 1 }, the payoff before cost for each agent in Q t is bounded above by f 0 (|s t |)+f 1 (|s t |) u). The difference between the two payoffs goes to infinity as Q → ∞, so for sufficiently large Q, it is optimal to follow the observation decision in (1) above given that every other agent follows σ(Q). Hence σ(Q) is an equilibrium.
Note that in σ(Q), starting from t = 2, agents in Q t always observe a t−1 1 regardless of s t .
Then we can apply Proposition 2 to obtain asymptotic learning in σ(Q).
Proof of Theorem 4. Consider the following strategy profile σ(Q) for agents in an arbitrary community Q t :
1. Given any s t , agent 1 observes the neighborhood B t of size K(t) that maximizes P σ(Q) (â t = θ|B t ), and no other agent makes any observation.
2. If h t = {a m : m ∈ B t }: fix some ǫ > 0. Let s(ǫ) be such that 1 − F 1 (s(ǫ)) = ǫ. An agent takes action 1 if s t ≥ s(ǫ) and action 0 if s t ≤ −s(ǫ). Otherwise, an agent takes the action that matches the state with higher probability according to observation only.
3. If h t = {a m : m ∈ B t }, each agent takes the action that matches the state with lower probability according to I t .
By the proofs of Lemma 3 and of Theorem 3, σ(Q) is an equilibrium. Then we can apply Theorem 1 to prove the result.
Proof of Proposition 4. Here I prove that there existsQ such that Theorem 1 can be generalized to the random community size model when H(Q(t) ≥Q) > 0, under the assumptions that Q(t) cannot be observed by agents after period t, and that agents in period t observe one action from each previous community. The other cases and the generalization of the other theorems can be proved using a similar argument.
For some fixedQ, consider the following action profile for agents in Q t :
1. If Q(t) <Q, choose action according to both signal and observation.
2. If Q(t) ≥Q, use the action profile specified in the proof of Theorem 1.
It is clear that whenQ is sufficiently large, the above action profile is an equilibrium. Denote this equilibrium as φ * . To show that Theorem 1 still holds, it suffices to show that the key result in Lemma 3 is still true in this model, i.e. P φ * (a k+1 =0|h,1) P φ * (a k+1 =0|h,0) has a < 1 upper bound which is independent of h. According to φ * , we can compute P φ * (a k+1 = 0|h, 1, Q(k + 1) <Q) and P φ * (a k+1 = 0|h, 0, Q(k + 1) ≥Q), and by Lemma 6 we know that P φ * (a k+1 = 0|h, 1, Q(k + 1) < Q) ≤ P φ * (a k+1 = 0|h, 0, Q(k + 1) ≥Q) for any h. On the other hand, by Lemma 3 we know that P φ * (a k+1 =0|h,1,Q(k+1)≥Q) P φ * (a k+1 =0|h,0,Q(k+1)≥Q) has a < 1 upper bound which is independent of h. Finally, note that P φ * (a k+1 = 0|h, 1) =H(Q(k + 1) <Q)P φ * (a k+1 = 0|h, 1, Q(k + 1) <Q)
+ H(Q(k + 1) ≥Q)P φ * (a k+1 = 0|h, 1, Q(k + 1) ≥Q) P φ * (a k+1 = 0|h, 0) =H(Q(k + 1) <Q)P φ * (a k+1 = 0|h, 0, Q(k + 1) <Q)
+ H(Q(k + 1) ≥Q)P φ * (a k+1 = 0|h, 0, Q(k + 1) ≥Q).
When H(Q(k + 1) ≥Q) > 0, we obtain the desired result on the upper bound. Therefore, Theorem 1 holds.
Proof of Proposition 5. Consider any Q ′ t ⊂ Q t of size Q ′ and any I t . Let a t (I t ) be the truth-seeking action profile and a ′ t (I t ) be an arbitrary action profile with unanimous action.
Without loss of generality, assume that a t n (I t ) = 1 and a
